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We tested two competing models for the brain basis of emotion, the basic emotion theory and the conceptual act theory of emotion, using resting-state
functional connectivity magnetic resonance imaging (rs-fcMRI). The basic emotion view hypothesizes that anger, sadness, fear, disgust and happiness
each arise from a brain network that is innate, anatomically constrained and homologous in other animals. The conceptual act theory of emotion
hypothesizes that an instance of emotion is a brain state constructed from the interaction of domain-general, core systems within the brain such as the
salience, default mode and frontoparietal control networks. Using peak coordinates derived from a meta-analysis of task-evoked emotion fMRI studies,
we generated a set of whole-brain rs-fcMRI discovery maps for each emotion category and examined the spatial overlap in their conjunctions. Instead of
discovering a specific network for each emotion category, variance in the discovery maps was accounted for by the known domain-general network.
Furthermore, the salience network is observed as part of every emotion category. These results indicate that specific networks for each emotion do not
exist within the intrinsic architecture of the human brain and instead support the conceptual act theory of emotion.
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INTRODUCTION
For the past 50 years, scientists have been largely convinced that certain
emotions, such as anger, fear, sadness, happiness and disgust, are bio-
logically basic, meaning that they are natural kinds (Barrett, 2006). In
this view, each emotion category arises from an innate, specific brain
module with homology to other animals [e.g. (Ekman, 1999; Keltner
and Ekman, 2000; Tracy and Randles, 2011)]1. This basic emotion view
has dominated the science of emotion, and is widely accepted in the
popular media, despite the fact the brain basis of emotion is still poorly
understood. Although careful and elegant studies of so-called ‘emo-
tional’ behavioral adaptations in non-human animals have revealed dis-
tinct neural circuits that control escape (Vazdarjanova and McGaugh,
1998), freezing (LeDoux, 2007) and fighting [e.g. offensive attack (Lin
et al., 2011); defensive aggression (Motta et al., 2009)], there are a
number of arguments for why a neural circuit for a behavior cannot
be considered a neural circuit for an emotion per se [e.g. (Barrett et al.,
2007; Barrett, 2012; LeDoux, 2012)]. For example, depending on the
circumstances, an animal might flee, freeze or fight when faced with
potential danger (i.e. during a ‘fearful’ situation). This introduces the
problem of having many fear circuits [e.g. (Gross and Canteras, 2012)]
and poses an inductive problem for the science of basic emotions.
Cognitive neuroscience and lesion research has searched for emotion
brain modules with little success [for recent meta-analytic evidence,
see (Kober et al., 2008; Lindquist et al., 2012); for a discussion, see
(Lindquist and Barrett, 2012; Barrett and Satpute, 2013)]. One recent
meta-analysis of the human neuroimaging literature was interpreted as
supportive of the basic emotion hypothesis (Vytal and Hamann, 2010),
but in fact reported limbic and non-limbic regions as showing consistent
but non-specific increases in activation during anger, sadness, fear, dis-
gust and happiness [for an alternative interpretation of their findings see
(Hamann 2012; Lindquist et al., 2012)].
In contrast to the basic emotion view, a constructionist approach to
emotion, the ‘conceptual act theory of emotion’ hypothesizes that an
emotion such as anger, sadness, fear, disgust or happiness is a popu-
lation of instances; the instances do not arise from their own, dedicated
brain network, but are instead constructed from the combination of
activity in domain-general, core brain systems that perform more basic
psychological functions such as salience detection, memory, sensory
perception, language and so on (Barrett, 2006, 2012; Lindquist and
Barrett, 2012; Barrett and Satpute, 2013). In particular, the conceptual
act theory of emotion predicts that the same intrinsic networks would
be engaged during a variety of emotions, although perhaps in different
patterns [for an extension of this view see (Oosterwijk et al., 2012)].
Indeed, preliminary support for the conceptual act theory of emotion
view can be observed in several recent neuroimaging experiments
(Wilson-Mendenhall et al., 2011, 2013) demonstrating the involve-
ment of brain areas associated with representing body states, salient
events, memory, sensory perception and language during emotional
experiences. Other evidence consistent with the conceptual act theory
of emotion comes from intracranial stimulation studies (Guillory
and Bujarski, 2014) as well as meta-analyses of neuroimaging experi-
ments demonstrating that domain-general brain systems are
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commonly engaged across a variety of emotion categories
(Lindquist et al., 2012) and during both emotional and cognitive
events (Lindquist and Barrett, 2012; Barrett and Satpute, 2013).
In this study, we compared the ‘basic emotion’ and ‘conceptual act’
theories using an analysis of the brain’s intrinsic functional connectivity.
A recent explosion of research demonstrates that the human brain con-
tains a small world architecture with densely connected ‘hubs’ (Sporns,
2013; van den Heuvel and Sporns, 2013). Within this structure, the
brain shows continuous, intrinsic activity organized as connected net-
works. These networks, referred to as ‘intrinsic networks’, are identified
in temporal correlations of the low-frequency blood oxygen level-de-
pendent (BOLD) signal fluctuations in voxels while a participant lays ‘at
rest’ during functional magnetic resonance imaging (called ‘resting-state
functional connectivity magnetic resonance imaging’ or rs-fcMRI).
Critically, patterns of intrinsic activity are quite similar to the patterns
of task-related activity [(Smith et al., 2009; Spector et al., 2009); for a
review see (Bressler and Menon, 2010)]. These networks also account for
a large proportion of the brain’s metabolic budget (Raichle, 2010).
Together, these findings have thus led researchers to conclude that spon-
taneous neuronal activity within these networks reflects the intrinsic
organization of the brain (Buckner et al., 2013), which in turn forms
the functional architecture of the mind (Menon, 2011; Lindquist and
Barrett, 2012; Barrett and Satpute, 2013;).
There are several reasons why intrinsic brain networks are useful for
comparing the basic emotion and conceptual act theories. First, intrin-
sic brain networks have anatomic and cross-species properties that
make rs-fcMRI an ideal approach for testing the basic emotion theory’s
hypothesis that dedicated emotion networks exist. Intrinsic networks
are anatomically constrained (van den Heuvel et al., 2009; Deco et al.,
2010; Pernice et al., 2011; Hermundstad et al., 2013), and can be
observed under anesthesia (Greicius et al., 2008). The networks are
found in people of different cultures [e.g. (Manoliu et al., 2013;
Wang et al., 2014)]. Several of the networks are homologous with
the networks that exist within the brains of other animals (Rilling
et al., 2007; Vincent et al., 2007; Hayes and Northoff, 2011; Mantini
et al., 2013). By comparison, basic emotion theory hypothesizes that (i)
each emotion is caused by a specific, dedicated network that is ana-
tomically intrinsic to the human brain, (ii) each network should be
universal and (iii) homologous in non-human animals. Furthermore,
some theories propose that these networks should be confined to sub-
cortical regions of the brain [e.g. (Panksepp, 1998)], making it difficult
to identify them in studies of humans where direct anatomical inves-
tigations are difficult. Second, many rs-fcMRI studies reveal the exist-
ence of domain-general intrinsic networks; these can be used to test the
conceptual act theory’s hypothesis that an emotion is constructed as an
interaction of domain-general systems. To date, networks have been
identified for salience (Seeley et al., 2007; Touroutoglou et al., 2012),
language (Lohmann et al., 2010; Tomasi and Volkow, 2012), executive
function (Seeley et al., 2007; Vincent et al., 2008), attention (Corbetta
et al., 2008; Vincent et al., 2008), semantic processing (Binder et al.,
2009), memory (Buckner et al., 2008; Dickerson and Eichenbaum,
2010) and other processes [(Yeo et al., 2011) for a review see
(Bressler and Menon, 2010)]. If emotions are constructed as inter-
actions of basic networks that subserve domain-general functions in
the brain, then rs-fcMRI analyses should reveal (i) evidence of many
intrinsic networks contributing to a single instance of an emotion
category and (ii) evidence of a common intrinsic network contributing
to different emotion categories. Thus, the rs-fcMRI approach, while
not a perfect window into the structure within the human brain, does
allow an opportunity to investigate the structural properties of the
brain in relation to emotion.
Although a number of intrinsic networks have now been replicated
across samples and analysis methods [e.g. seed-based rs-fcMRI
(Vincent et al., 2008); independent components analysis (Smith
et al., 2009)], no studies to date have explicitly used rs-fcMRI to exam-
ine whether a specific intrinsic connectivity network can be identified
for each emotion category.
In this study, we thus used a ‘seed and discover’ method (Vincent
et al., 2008) to assess whether there are specific intrinsic networks for
specific emotions or whether the networks underlying emotional ex-
periences and perceptions are comprised as combinations of domain-
general intrinsic networks such as those found in Shirer et al. (2012),
Yeo et al. (2011) and Smith et al. (2009) (e.g. networks involved in
salience detection, memory, attention, language, motor function and
sensation). The ‘seed and discover method’ relied on two types of
evidence: meta-analytic data and resting-state data. (i) Meta-analytic
peaks of task-evoked fMRI activity; these identified a priori regions of
interest (ROIs) that consistently showed an increase in activity during
emotional experiences and emotion perception. (ii) These peaks were
then used as ‘seeds’ in the analysis of rs-fcMRI data from two samples
to generate the intrinsic ‘discovery’ maps for each emotion category
(Sample 1, N¼ 89; Sample 2, N¼ 300). In particular, we extracted the
time course of BOLD activity from a predefined ‘seed’ region and
compared it to the time course of all other voxels in the brain. The
result was a ‘discovery’ map of voxels that showed a similar BOLD
response across time. Voxels whose time courses correlate significantly
with one another are considered to be part of the same rs-fcMRI in-
trinsic network.
To investigate whether intrinsic networks exist for anger, disgust,
fear, sadness and happiness, we chose ROI seeds from the activation
peaks reported in Vytal and Hamann’s (2010) meta-analysis of task-
related functional neuroimaging studies of emotion experience and
perception (see Table 1). In contrast to resting-state functional con-
nectivity analyses, task-evoked fMRI studies reveal brain regions that
show increases in activation (relative to some baseline condition)
during specific psychological tasks or conditions (e.g. experiencing
anger relative to a neutral emotional state). Meta-analyses of task-
evoked activity overcome the Type I error prevalent in individual
task-evoked fMRI studies by revealing those brain areas that consist-
ently show increases in activity during a particular condition (e.g.
anger) across studies (cf. Lindquist et al. 2012). Using the activation
likelihood estimation meta-analytic method, Vytal and Hamannn
(2010) thus identified regions that were consistently activated across
studies for each of the five emotion categories (anger, sadness, fear,
disgust and happiness).
If anatomically constrained networks for each emotion category
exist in the intrinsic architecture of the human brain, as the basic
emotion view predicts, then the meta-analytically derived seed regions
for a given emotion category (i.e. the peaks of consistent activation for
a given category of emotion, such as happiness) should produce ‘dis-
covery’ maps whose spatial overlap reveals a network for that category.
This finding would provide strong support for the hypothesis that
emotions are biologically basic categories reflected in the intrinsic
structure of the brain. Alternatively, if the peaks observed in Vytal
and Hamannn (2010) are nodes in domain-general intrinsic networks,
as predicted by the conceptual act theory of emotion, then the con-
junction of the discovery maps for a given emotion category would not
converge on a single network. Instead, emotion-based seeds would give
evidence of the domain-general intrinsic networks that are already
known to exist in the literature.
To ascertain the degree of spatial overlap between the discovery
maps that were generated by the meta-analytically derived emotion
seeds and the maps for well-known domain-general intrinsic networks
(i.e. visual, language, episodic memory, executive function, salience
detection networks) (Yeo et al., 2011; Shirer et al., 2012), we used a
goodness-of-fit metric (Greicius et al., 2004). The conceptual act
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theory of emotion hypothesizes that emotional instances are con-
structed from the interactions of these domain-general networks.
According to this hypothesis, the brain predicts incoming sensory
input from the body and the world by categorizing it, thereby con-
structing it into meaningful emotional experiences and perceptions
(Barrett, 2009, 2012; Lindquist and Barrett, 2012; Barrett, 2013,
2014). From this perspective, the salience, default mode network
(DMN) and frontoparietal control networks are centrally important
to constructing instances emotion (being involved in interoception,
semantic processing and categorization, respectively), but so too are
the exteroceptive and other attention networks as well. An instance of
emotion is understood as a brain state, constructed as the ongoing
interaction of brain networks.
Finally, we also assessed the conceptual act theory of emotion hy-
pothesis that all emotions constructed with the ‘salience network’. The
strength of connectivity within this network is correlated to the inten-
sity of affective experience (Seeley et al., 2007; Touroutoglou et al.,
2012, 2014) and nodes within this network show an increase in acti-
vation across varying instances of emotions in task-evoked studies
(Wilson-Mendenhall et al., 2013). Furthermore, this network is par-
ticularly relevant to negative emotions (Seeley et al., 2007; Hayes and
Northoff, 2011; Bickart et al., 2012; Touroutoglou et al., 2012, 2014).
To test this hypothesis, we used the same seed and discover method to
determine whether there was any spatial overlap between the ‘discov-
ery’ maps for anger, sadness, fear and disgust. Support for basic emo-
tion theory would be found if the different negative emotion categories
each had a distinct network. Support for the conceptual act theory of
emotion would be found if the different negative emotion categories




Sample 1 consisted of 89 young adults (44 men) ranging in age from 18
to 33, with a mean age of 22.4 years (s.d.¼ 3.34). Sample 2 consisted of
300 young adults (150 men) with a mean age of 22.3 years (s.d.¼ 1.94)
(rs-fcMRI data from both samples have been previously published in
Yeo et al., 2011). All participants were right-handed, native English
speakers and had normal or corrected-to-normal vision. No partici-
pant reported a history of neurological or psychiatric disorder.
fMRI data acquisition and preprocessing procedures
Data were collected with a 3 T Tim Trio System (Siemens Medical
Systems, Erlangen, Germany), using a 12-channel phased-array head
coil. Structural data in Sample 1 and 2 were acquired using a 3D T1-
weighted magnetization-prepared gradient-echo image [repetition
time (TR)¼ 2200 ms; echo time (TE)¼ 1.54 ms; flip angle
(FA)¼ 708, 1.2 mm isotropic voxels]. Whole-brain fMRI data were
acquired with echo-planar sequence [Sample 1 and Sample 2:
TR¼ 3000 ms; TE¼ 30 ms; FA¼ 908; 3.0 mm isotropic voxels, 47
slices]. During the resting-state fMRI runs, participants were instructed
to keep their eyes open. Head motion was minimized using head re-
straints, including a pillow and foam padding. Noise was attenuated
with ear plugs.
Preprocessing of the fMRI data involved a series of previously es-
tablished rs-fcMRI procedures (Van Dijk et al., 2010), including (i)
removal of the first four volumes to allow for T1 equilibration effects,
(ii) slice timing correction (SPM2, Wellcome Department of Cognitive
Neurology, London, UK) and (iii) head motion correction [Functional
MRI of the Brain (FMRIB), Oxford, UK]. Data were normalized to the
Montreal Neurological Institute (MNI) atlas space (SPM2, Wellcome
Department of Cognitive Neurology, London, UK) and resampled to
2-mm cubic voxels. A low-pass temporal filter removed frequencies
higher than 0.08 Hz. Data were spatially smoothed using a 6-mm full-
width half-maximum Gaussian filter. Sources of spurious variance and
their temporal derivatives were removed through linear regression
including (i) six parameters obtained by rigid-body correction of
head motion correction, (ii) the signal averaged over the whole
brain, (iii) the signal averaged over the ventricles and (iv) the signal
averaged over the deep cerebral white matter.
Functional connectivity analysis
Selection of ROIs
The atlas coordinates of all seed ROIs are presented in Table 1. To
examine whether emotion seed ROIs reveal intrinsic emotion net-
works, we used peak activations that were more consistent than ex-
pected by chance for each emotion within the Vytal and Hamann
(2010) meta-analysis (for the validity of this ‘seed and discover’
method see Supplementary Materials). As the seeds for the discovery
maps, we selected the peak activations of three different regions with
the largest cluster of activation for each emotion category. Our ration-
ale was that these ROIs would constitute the most spatially discrimin-
able regions for each presumed ‘basic’ emotion. For ease of reporting,
we only present the analysis using the three largest peak activations (i.e.
those showing the highest degree of consistency among individual
studies in the literature) reported for each emotion in Vytal and
Hamannn (2010). To ensure that the number of peaks analyzed did
not affect the analysis, we also performed a ‘seed and discover’ analysis
using all peak activations reported for each emotion in Vytal and
Hamannn (2010) (9–19 peaks per emotion) (see Supplementary
Figures S2–S4).




Right superior temporal gyrus (R STG)* 48 55 4
Left anterior cingulate cortex (L ACC) 2 43 7
Left cerebellum 40 63 25
Anger
Left inferior frontal gyrus (L IFG)* 45 23 3
Right parahippocampal gyrus (R PHG) 19 20 11
Left fusiform gyrus 44 72 18
Fear
Left amygdala * 23 6 11
Right amygdala 23 10 14
Right cerebellum 33 54 15
Right insula 43 3 2
Sadness
Left medial frontal gyrus (L medFG)* 4 47 32
AmygdaRight inferior frontal gyrus (R IFG) 40 6 23
Left caudate head 10 19 9
Disgust
Right inferior frontal gyrus/insula (rIFG/insula)* 31 5 4
Left inferior frontal gyrus/insula (rIFG/insula) 26 29 10
Left lingual gyrus 22 72 11
Left amygdala 20 3 17
Note: This article used a set of three different regions found to be consistently active during each
emotion category previously reported in the Vytal and Hamann (2010) meta-analysis of task-induced
emotion activations. We selected the three peak activations with the largest cluster of activation for
happiness, anger, and sadness. We included four peaks of activation for fear and disgust because the
two peaks with the largest cluster of activation were both within the same brain region in different
hemispheres. The set of regions for emotions are listed in rank order, based on the size of meta-
analytic cluster of activation (*indicates the regions with the largest activation peak for each
emotion). All coordinates are referenced to the MNI coordinate system.
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Overlapping spatial topography of the rs-fcMRI discovery maps
To create each ‘discovery’ map, we created spherical ROIs (4 mm
radius) around each seed region and then computed Pearson’s product
moment correlations (r) between the mean signal time course of each
seed region and the time course of all other voxels in the brain. The
resulting correlation maps were converted to z-values, using Fisher’s
r-to-z transformation and were averaged across participants. To ex-
plore whether each set of seed regions revealed a unified intrinsic
connectivity network, we next computed a spatial conjunction analysis
on the discovery maps for each emotion category. Specifically, the
group-level z-score maps for the seed reference regions were binarized
at a minimum threshold of z(r)¼ 0.25. We then computed their con-
vergent spatial overlap, identifying voxels with z(r) values 0.25 in all
seed regions. All maps are shown on slices in MNI atlas space using the
FSL view toolbox (http://www.fmrib.ox.ac.uk/fsl) (for the validity of
this method see Supplementary Materials).
In addition to generating spatial convergence maps, we quantified
the strength of functional connectivity between the seed regions by
calculating Fisher’s r-to-z correlation coefficients between each pair
of seeds. Next, we calculated the average connectivity measure of
z(r) values between the seeds associated with the three seeds for each
emotion category. As a reference range for functional connectivity
strength values, we calculated the average connectivity measure of
z(r) values within the well-known ‘DMN’ [e.g. (Andrews-Hanna
et al., 2010) (see Supplementary Materials)]. As a control analysis,
we selected seed ROIs in visual, motor and auditory cortex that are
typically uncorrelated (as in Van Dijk et al., 2010) (see Supplementary
Materials).
To test the hypothesis that seed regions from each negative emotion
were part of the same intrinsic rs-fcMRI network [i.e. the salience
network (Seeley et al., 2007)], we examined the conjunction of the
discovery maps for the single largest (i.e. most spatially distinctive)
meta-analytic peak for each discrete negative emotion (see Table 1).
Goodness-of-fit analysis between the rs-fcMRI emotion maps
and primary intrinsic connectivity networks
To test the hypothesis that the emotion seed regions produced rs-
fcMRI maps that were representative of canonical intrinsic connectiv-
ity networks, we calculated a goodness-of-fit metric (Greicius et al.,
2004) that represented a spatial similarity index over the entire map.
For this analysis, we chose a set of 14 intrinsic connectivity networks
identified by Shirer et al. (2012) (Table 2; see also Figure 2S in
Shirer et al (2012). Because the ‘salience network’ plays a critical role
in affective experience (Seeley et al., 2007; Touroutoglou et al., 2012,
2014), we included the dorsal salience subnetwork [most clearly invol-
ving connections between the dorsal anterior insula and dorsal anterior
cingulate cortex (ACC)] and the ventral salience subnetwork network
(involving connections between ventral anterior insula and pregenual
ACC extending to the subgenual ACC) identified by Touroutoglou
et al. (2012). The canonical intrinsic connectivity networks of interest
included in this analysis are presented in Table 2.
A template of each of the intrinsic connectivity networks of interest
was used to select the ‘best-fit’ of rs-fcMRI emotion maps. We used the
template-matching procedure developed by Greicius et al. (2004) that
involved taking the average z score of voxels falling within the template
minus the average z score of voxels outside the template and selecting
the network of interest in which this difference (the goodness-of-fit)
was the greatest. As a reference range for goodness-of-fit values, we
calculated the goodness-of-fit metric between the rs-fcMRI DMN
maps and the canonical intrinsic connectivity networks (see
Supplementary Materials). We expected the rs-fcMRI DMN discovery
maps to have high fit values with dorsal and ventral DMN but low fit
values with the sensorimotor, auditory or visuospatial networks iden-
tified by Shirer et al. (2012).
Reliability of rs-fcMRI emotion maps
To assess the reliability of the strength of connectivity of the rs-fcMRI
emotion maps, we computed intraclass correlation coefficients (ICC)
(two-way random effects with absolute agreement) between the con-
nectivity z(r) values between the trio of seeds associated with each
emotion category in Samples 1 2, using PASW Statistics 18, Release
Version 18.0.0 (SPSS, Inc., 2009, Chicago, IL, www.spss.com).
RESULTS
Peaks of consistent activity during emotion belong to
domain-general intrinsic networks
Inconsistent with the basic emotion hypothesis and consistent with the
conceptual act theory of emotion hypothesis, we did not find strong
evidence for intrinsic networks corresponding to specific emotions
(Figure 1). For instance, the anger peak discovery maps (created
from three of the largest meta-analytic activation peaks from Vytal
and Hamann, 2010 and the voxels correlated with each peak) did
not share spatial overlap with one another. As a result, the conjunction
of the anger discovery maps was empty, indicating that an anatomic-
ally constrained network for anger does not exist within the intrinsic
architecture of the human brain. Neither ‘discovery’ maps at our a
priori threshold of z(r)¼ 0.25, nor maps at a less stringent threshold
of z(r)¼ 0.1, revealed an intrinsic network. We repeated this analysis,
with the same result, for the peaks that consistently activated in Vytal
and Hamann’s analysis during sadness, fear, disgust and happiness.
The average connectivity strength, z(r), between the seed regions for
the five emotions are shown in Figure 2. Furthermore, when we re-
peated the analysis using a larger number of seeds from all the meta-
analytic peaks available in Vytal and Hamannn (2010), the results did
not change. Specifically, 13 peaks that were consistently activated
during anger, 19 peaks that were consistently activated during sadness,
10 peaks that were consistently activated during fear, 16 peaks that
were consistently activated for disgust and 9 peaks that were consist-
ently activated during happiness in Vytal and Hamannn (2010) meta-
analysis did not together reveal an intrinsic network for each emotion
category (see Supplementary Figures S2 and S3).
Instead, the goodness-of-fit analysis revealed that Vytal and
Hamann (2010)’s peaks were nodes in the set of domain-general in-
trinsic networks already identified in the literature (Table 3; see also
Table 2 Intrinsic connectivity networks of interest used for the goodness-of-fit analysis
Dorsal and ventral salience networks identified by Touroutoglou et al. (2012)
1. Dorsal anterior insula network (Dorsal Salience)
2. Ventral anterior insula network (Ventral Salience)
Intrinsic connectivity networks identified by Shirer et al. (2012)
1. Insula/dorsal ACC (Anterior Salience)
2. Posterior insula (Posterior Salience)
3. Auditory
4. Basal ganglia
5. PCC/Medial prefrontal cortex (dorsal DMN)
6. Retrosplenial cortex/medial temporal lobe (ventral DMN)
7. Language
8. Left dorsolateral prefrontal cortex/Left parietal lobe (Left executive control network, ECN)
9. Right dorsolateral prefrontal cortex /Right Parietal Lobe (Right executive control network, ECN)
10. Intraparietal sulcus/Frontal Eye Field (Visuospatial)
11. Precuneus
12. Primary visual cortex,V1
13. Secondary visual cortex,V2 (High-level visual)
14. Sensorimotor
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Supplementary Figure S4). Within each emotion category, the discov-
ery maps did not show convergent overlap with just a single intrinsic
network. For example, the superior temporal gyrus ROI that showed
consistent increases in activity across studies of happiness was part of
the visuospatial intrinsic network and the high-level visual network. In
contrast, the left pregeneual ACC ROI that showed consistent increases
across studies of happiness was part of the ventral salience network and
dorsal DMN (see Table 3). Critically, intrinsic networks were identified
in the discovery maps of multiple negative emotions categories. As an
example, the domain-general dorsal salience network was identified in
the discovery maps for different negative emotion categories, i.e. fear,
disgust and sadness. The dorsal extent of the DMN was also identified
in the discovery maps for all emotion categories (see Supplementary
Figure S4).
Finally, as predicted by the conceptual act theory of emotion
hypothesis, our seed and discovery method for the negative emotion
categories revealed the salience network. Spatial overlap between
discovery maps derived from the largest meta-analytic peak for each
negative emotion revealed regions within the salience network, such
ventral anterior insula, caudate and thalamus (Figure 3). To further
Fig. 1 The conjunction of discovery maps from meta-analytic activation peaks for happiness, anger, fear, sadness, and disgust at z(r)¼ 0.1 (Sample 1, N¼ 89). In (a), voxels that preferentially correlate with
the left superior temporal gyrus (STG) seed are shown in blue, voxels that correlate with left ACC seed are shown in red, and voxels that correlate with the left cerebellum seed are shown in yellow. In (b),
voxels that preferentially correlate with left inferior frontal gyrus (IFG) seed are shown in blue, voxels that correlate with right parahippocampal gyrus (PHG) seed are shown in red, and voxels that correlate with
the fusiform gyrus seed are shown in yellow. In (c), voxels that preferentially correlate with bilateral amygdala seed regions are shown in blue, voxels that correlate with the right cerebellum seed are shown in
red, and voxels that correlate with right insula seed are shown in yellow. In (d), voxels that preferentially correlate with left medial frontal gyrus (medFG) seed are shown in blue, voxels that correlate with the
right inferior frontal gyrus (IFG) seed are shown in red, and voxels that correlate with the left caudate seed are shown in yellow. In (e), voxels that preferentially correlate with bilateral inferior frontal gyrus/
insula (IFG/insula) seed are shown in blue, voxels that correlate with the left lingual gyrus seed (IFG) are shown in red, and voxels that correlate with the left amygdala seed are shown in yellow. The binarized
correlation maps, z(r)¼ 0.1 are overlaid on the 1 mm MNI152 T1-standard template image in FSL (http://www.fmrib.ox.ac.uk/fsl).
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examine whether the ventral anterior insula, caudate and thalamus
were indeed evidence of the broader salience network, we performed
an exploratory analysis where we lowered the threshold to z(r)¼ 0.05.
At this lower threshold, it became clear that the activity in ventral
anterior insula, caudate and thalamus that we observed was indeed
part of the canonical salience network (Seeley et al., 2007;
Touroutoglou et al., 2012). Of note, we did not formally address
whether seeds from happiness converged on the salience network, as
there was only one positive emotion in our analysis. Nonetheless, as
seen in the goodness-of-fit analysis (see Table 3), the happiness intrin-
sic connectivity map (anchored by the ACC) included regions that also
overlapped with the ventral salience network.
Reliability of rs-fcMRI emotion maps
All networks showed high reliability across Samples 1 and 2, support-
ing the generalizability of our observations that basic emotion net-
works do not exist within the intrinsic architecture of the human
brain. Most importantly, the ICC across the two samples for the con-
nectivity z(r) values between the trio of seeds associated with each
emotion demonstrated high reliability for happiness (ICC¼ 0.98,
two-way random effects, p < 0.02), fear (ICC¼ 0.98, two-way
random effects, p < 0.02), sadness (ICC¼ 0.99, two-way random ef-
fects, p < 0.09) disgust (ICC¼ 0.99, two-way random effects,
p < 0.05), although they were lower for anger (ICC¼ 0.65, two-way
random effects, p¼ ns).
DISCUSSION
We used an intrinsic connectivity approach to compare two competing
hypotheses about the brain basis of emotion. One view hypothesizes
that certain emotions (anger, disgust, fear, happiness and sadness) are
biologically ‘basic’ and arise from innate, anatomically constrained
brain networks that are homologous in human and non-human ani-
mals. Support for this hypothesis would have arisen if we observed
anatomically constrained intrinsic networks for specific emotions. This
would have been observed if brain regions with consistent increases in
activity during emotion experience and perception were each asso-
ciated with a single intrinsic brain network (e.g. areas that had
increased activity during experiences and perceptions of anger were
part of an intrinsic network for anger). The alternative theoretical ap-
proach, the ‘conceptual act theory’ of emotion, hypothesizes that emo-
tions are constructed from the interaction of domain-general, core
systems within the brain. Support for the constructionist hypothesis
would arise if we discovered that the regions consistently active during
emotional experiences and perceptions were parts of domain-general
networks that perform more basic psychological functions. The Vytal
and Hamannn (2010) meta-analysis identified peak activation coord-
inates that consistently showed an increase in activation during the
experience or perception of a given emotion spanning many studies
using many different methods; we asked ‘do the voxels in these peaks
belong to the same intrinsic network in brain, or do they belong to
different intrinsic networks working together?’ Furthermore, the seed-
based method employed here is sensitive enough to show spontaneous
activity of subcortical regions (Bickart et al., 2012). We therefore had
the power to reveal evidence for anatomically based subcortical net-
works for each emotion that have been proposed by some basic emo-
tion theorists (e.g. Panksepp, 1998), if they exist.
Using a ‘seed and discovery’ method, we did not find evidence for
emotion-specific networks within the intrinsic functional architecture
of the brain. Instead, our emotion discovery maps reflected combin-
ations of domain-general networks, such as the salience network,
DMN, basal ganglia network and executive control network, consistent
with the hypothesis that different emotions arise from the interaction
of domain-general systems within the brain (Barrett, 2012; Lindquist
and Barrett, 2012; Barrett and Satpute, 2013). Further evidence for a
domain-general constructionist account about emotion comes from
our finding that a conjunction of discovery maps for anger, sadness,
fear and disgust each revealed major nodes of the salience network
Table 3 The goodness-of-fit values for the emotion discovery maps
Happiness Anger Fear Sadness Disgust
Reference
networks
R STG L ACC L cerebellum L IFG R PHG L fusiform gyrus L amygdala R amygdala R cerebellum R insula L medfg R IFG L caudate R IFG/Insula L IFG/Insula L lingual gyrus L amygdala
Dorsal salience 0.28 0.11 0.10
Ventral salience 0.35 0.11 0.18
Anterior salience 0.12 0.16
Posterior salience 0.22
Dorsal DMN 0.40 0.33 0.14
Basal ganglia 0.11 0.12 0.19 0.11
Language 0.21
L executive control 0.21
Visuospatial 0.16 0.17
Auditory 0.32
Primary visual 0.12 0.31
High-level visual 0.11 0.24 0.29 0.36
Note: goodness-of-fit values lower than 0.1 are not shown in the table for ease of viewing.
Fig. 2 The average strength of intrinsic connectivity, z(r), values between the three seeds associated
with each emotion category, the three seeds associated with the DNM (default mode network) (see
Supplementary Materials), and the control seeds [associated with motor (Mot), auditory (Aud) and
vision (Vis) networks; see Supplementary Materials] in Samples 1 and 2.
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(Seeley et al., 2007) consisting of the anterior insula, caudate, thalamus
and ACC. Consistent with this interpretation, the salience network
shows task-evoked activity during the experience of unpleasant affect
(Hayes and Northoff, 2011; Lindquist et al., 2015). Furthermore, in-
dividuals with stronger intrinsic connectivity in the salience network
report more intense anxiety (Seeley et al., 2007) and arousal when
viewing negative images (Touroutoglou et al., 2012). Our findings
are also consistent with Laird et al. (2011)’s results showing that a
limbic intrinsic connectivity system comprising mostly of limbic and
medial temporal regions of the large-scale distributed salience network
was associated with the perception of different emotions, i.e. happiness
and fear. Together, these findings suggest that the salience network
might be playing a general function across instances of anger, disgust,
fear and sadness by representing the feeling of arousal that is common
to each of the four emotion categories.
Using this interpretive framework, our results are consistent with
other meta-analytic findings (Lindquist et al., 2012) showing that
many of the brain regions with consistent increases in activation
across studies of the same emotion category are, in fact, nodes from
different intrinsic networks that have been associated with other basic
psychological functions, such as attention, language, memory, salience
detection and motor control. Moreover, brain regions with consistent
increases during emotion experience and perception can be decom-
posed into a set of functional groups (i.e. regions that coactivate across
studies) (Kober et al., 2008) that resemble the intrinsic networks we
observed in the present report. One possibility then is that intrinsic
networks support general psychological processes that form
fundamental ‘ingredients’ that contribute to the construction of all
manner of mental states (Lindquist and Barrett, 2012; Barrett and
Satpute, 2013). For instance, the salience network appears to play a
general function across instances of anger, disgust, fear and sadness
(Lindquist et al., 2012) as well as other ‘emotional’ events including
empathy (Decety and Jackson, 2004) and autonomic regulation (Craig,
2002; Vogt, 2005). Nodes within the ‘salience’ network are also
engaged during ‘cognitive’ events, such as language and executive func-
tion tasks [i.e. dorsal anterior insula and dorsal ACC; (Nelson et al.,
2010; Touroutoglou et al., 2012)] and attention allocation tasks [i.e.
dorsal anterior insula and dorsal ACC; (Corbetta et al., 2008)]. This
lack of domain-specificity has led to the interpretation that the salience
network functions to orient the brain’s processing capacity toward the
most homeostatically relevant information (constituting a body-based
source of attention within the human brain; Lindquist and Barrett,
2012; Barrett and Satpute, 2013) to guide the brain’s ‘switching’ or
‘reorienting’ between ‘internal’ and ‘external’ events (Corbetta et al.,
2008; Menon and Uddin, 2010).
Similarly, nodes within the DMN are engaged during emotion
(Lindquist et al., 2012), and also appear to serve more domain-general
functions. The DMN nodes are engaged in remembering personal
events (autobiographical memory) (Buckner et al., 2008), imagining
the future (prospection) (Andrews-Hanna et al., 2010), accessing
memory for word meanings (semantic memory), scene construction
and context-based object perception (Binder et al., 2009) as well as
moral reasoning (Bzdok et al., 2012) and person perception, leading to
the suggestion that the DMN creates ‘situated conceptualizations’
Fig. 3 A conjunction map for negative emotions. This figure displays a conjunction map of the binarized maps, z(r)¼ 0.05, seeded by the most prominent peak of each negative emotion (i.e., anger; L Inferior
Frontal Gyrus seed, sadness; L medial Frontal Gyrus seed, fear; L amygdala seed, and disgust; L Inferior Frontal Gyrus/insula seed).
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(Barrett, 2012; Lindquist et al., 2012; Lindquist and Barrett, 2012) or
‘mental models’ (Barrett and Satpute, 2013) of the meaning of sensa-
tions from the body and world during cognitions, emotions and
perceptions.
It is tempting to assume that the lack of specificity for each emotion
category is a function of the coarse spatial and temporal resolution in
the resting-state brain data (or the brain imaging experiments, for that
matter), but even human lesion studies (Hurlemann et al., 2009;
Feinstein et al., 2013) and studies that electrically stimulate specific
neurons in fully conscious humans have not been able to identify
specific neural modules for specific emotions [e.g. (Guillory and
Bujarski, 2014); for a review of studies, see (Barrett et al., 2007)].
For instance, consistent with our intrinsic network findings, electrical
stimulation of the human brain from intracranial electrodes reveals
broadly distributed networks across the cortex, paralimbic and
limbic cortex and subcortex that contribute to the representation of
multiple emotional states (Guillory and Bujarski, 2014). A growing
evidence from other domains has also failed to find evidence of bio-
logically basic emotions, such as studies of autonomic function in
humans (Cacioppo et al., 2000; Kreibig, 2010), facial expressions in
infants and adults (Camras et al., 2002; Russell et al., 2003; Barrett and
Kensinger, 2010; Barrett, 2011) and studies of vocal acoustics
(Bachorowski and Owren, 2002).
A related possibility is that emotions are represented as task-evoked
functional brain networks that flexibly combine in a given moment to
produce the experience or perception of anger, disgust, fear, happiness,
sadness and so on [as hypothesized (Hamann, 2012)]. Such a hypoth-
esis is not orthogonal to a constructionist interpretation we are offer-
ing, although we did not examine task-dependent BOLD data and so
did not test this idea explicitly in this report. For example, if the brain
possesses of a set of intrinsic networks that can be understood as per-
forming domain-general operations, then it is possible that each pro-
cess can be observed as a set of basic processing modes [aka ‘functional
motifs’ (Sporns and Kotter, 2004)], arising from the anatomical con-
nections that undergirds each network [aka ‘structural motifs’ (Sporns
and Kotter, 2004)]. In this framework, individual instances of anger,
disgust, fear, etc, could be understood as high dimensional brain states
reflecting neural assemblies within broadly distributed networks, as
well as the dynamic interaction of those assemblies (cf. Lindquist
and Barrett, 2012; Barrett and Satpute, 2013). Consistent with this
prediction, in another study from our lab we used task-evoked func-
tional connectivity and examined the relationship between the inten-
sity of ongoing emotional experiences of anger, sadness and fear, on
the one hand, and the continually fluctuating functional connectivity
strength between regions of the salience and default networks on the
other (Raz, Touroutoglou et al., under review). Across five samples of
subjects, we predicted and found that the dynamic variation in the
functional connectivity between intrinsic networks across time (i.e.
changing cohesiveness) constituted a shared mechanism for intense
experiences of sadness, fear and anger. These findings are ultimately
consistent with the findings reported herein because they suggest that
momentary experiences of emotion are related to the functional cou-
pling of intrinsic connectivity networks.
More broadly, our findings are consistent with an alternative frame-
work for understanding the brain’s functional architecture. The fact
that peak activations from different emotion categories belong to
domain-general intrinsic functional connectivity networks is consistent
with a broader constructionist view of the mind (Lindquist and
Barrett, 2012; Barrett and Satpute, 2013), more generally. A construc-
tionist model of mind–brain correspondence hypothesizes that all
mental states emerge (i.e. are ‘constructed’) from the interaction of
more basic psychological processes that are not specific to folk psy-
chological distinctions such as ‘emotion’, ‘cognition’, ‘memory’ or
‘perception’. Emotions, cognitive functions and perceptions can be
thought of as mental events (prompted by specific experimental
tasks or arising as naturally occurring states) that are constructed
from interactions within and between intrinsic networks that compute
domain-general functions. A host of neuroscience research findings
point toward a constructionist functional architecture of the brain
that relies on distributed structure-function mappings. This construc-
tionist approach echoes other debates about modularity throughout
neuroscience (e.g. in face perception), which center on whether a phe-
nomenon has dedicated neural modules or is constructed from more
domain-general elements (Anderson and Finlay, 2014; Grill-Spector
and Weiner, 2014). Taken together, our and other findings stress the
need for revisions in the psychological ontologies so that they are
consistent with structure and function of the brain [cf. (Poldrack,
2010; Fox and Friston, 2012; Lindquist and Barrett, 2012; Anderson
et al., 2013; Barrett and Satpute, 2013)].
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